Multimodal disinformation about otherness on the internet : the spread of racist, xenophobic and Islamophobic fake news in 2020 by Gamir-Ríos, José et al.
ISSN 2340-5236 Anàlisi 64, 2021 49-64
Multimodal disinformation about otherness on the 
internet . The spread of racist, xenophobic and 










Submission date: January 2021
Accepted date: April 2021
Published in: June 2021
Recommended citation: GAMIR-RÍOS, J.; TARULLO, R. and IBÁÑEZ-CUQUERELLA, M. 
(2021). “Multimodal disinformation about otherness on the internet. The spread of racist, 
xenophobic and Islamophobic fake news in 2020”. Anàlisi: Quaderns de Comunicació i Cultu-
ra, 64, 49-64. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/analisi.3398>
Abstract
This work studies the use of disinformation to construct an image of otherness through 
the internet. We applied a content analysis methodology to the 161 racist, xenophobic or 
Islamophobic fake news pieces that were discredited in 2020 by the four Spanish infor-
mation verification media entities accredited by the International Fact-Checking Net-
work: Maldita.es, Newtral, Efe Verifica and Verificat. The results show that the most com-
monly used formats were image and video, that disinformation was most often based on 
taking information out of context and deception, and that the source could not be identi-
fied. The most shared characteristics associated otherness with receiving aid, violence and 
illegal immigration. The most commonly used images were photographs, which mostly 
showed people in a general manner (not individually). Despite this, disinformation was 
* This research has been carried out in the framework of the project entitled “Strategies, 
agendas and discourse in electoral cybercampaigns: media and citizens” (CSO2016–
77331-C2–1-R), of the research group Mediaflows.
José Gamir-Ríos; Raquel Tarullo; Miguel Ibáñez-
Cuquerella
50 Anàlisi 64, 2021 José Gamir-Ríos; Raquel Tarullo; Miguel Ibáñez-Cuquerella
not generated by manipulating images, but by inserting text over images. The use of sup-
posed screenshots to create fictitious references or take truthful screenshots out of context 
was also notable.
Keywords: disinformation; social networks; otherness; racism; xenophobia; Islamophobia
Resum. La desinformació multimodal sobre l’alteritat a Internet. Difusió de boles racistes, 
xenòfobes i islamòfobes el 2020
Aquest treball estudia la construcció de la imatge de l’alteritat a través de la desinformació 
a Internet. Per fer-ho, aplica una metodologia d’anàlisi de contingut a les 161 boles de 
caràcter racista, xenòfob o islamòfob desmentides el 2020 pels quatre mitjans espanyols 
de verificació d’informació acreditats per la International Fact-Checking Network: Mal-
dita.es, Newtral, Efe Verifica i Verificat. Els resultats evidencien que els formats més 
emprats van ser la imatge i el vídeo, i que les desinformacions es van basar majoritària-
ment en la descontextualització i l’engany, sense identificar-ne la font. Els atributs més 
transmesos van associar l’alteritat a la recepció d’ajudes, la violència i la immigració irre-
gular. Les imatges més utilitzades van ser les fotografies, que majoritàriament van repre-
sentar les persones de manera no individualitzada; no obstant això, la desinformació no es 
va produir a través de la manipulació visual, sinó de la inserció de text. També va ser 
notable la difusió de suposades captures de pantalla, aprofitades per crear referents ficticis 
o descontextualitzar-ne uns altres que existien realment.
Paraules clau: desinformació; xarxes socials; alteritat; racisme; xenofòbia; islamofòbia
Resumen. La desinformación multimodal sobre la otredad en Internet. Difusión de bulos 
racistas, xenófobos e islamófobos en 2020
Este trabajo estudia la construcción de la imagen de la otredad a través de la desinforma-
ción en Internet. Para ello, aplica una metodología de análisis de contenido a los 161 
bulos de carácter racista, xenófobo o islamófobo desmentidos en 2020 por los cuatro 
medios españoles de verificación de información acreditados por la International Fact- 
Checking Network: Maldita.es, Newtral, Efe Verifica y Verificat. Los resultados eviden-
cian que los formatos más empleados fueron la imagen y el vídeo, y que las desinforma-
ciones se basaron mayoritariamente en la descontextualización y el engaño, sin identificar 
su fuente. Los atributos más transmitidos asociaron la otredad a la recepción de ayudas, la 
violencia y la inmigración irregular. Las imágenes más empleadas fueron las fotografías, 
que mayoritariamente representaron a las personas de manera no individualizada; sin 
embargo, la desinformación no se produjo a través de la manipulación visual, sino de la 
inserción de texto. También fue notable la difusión de supuestas capturas de pantalla, 
aprovechadas para crear referentes ficticios o descontextualizar otros realmente existentes.
Palabras clave: desinformación; redes sociales; otredad; racismo; xenofobia; islamofobia
1. Introduction
The spread of disinformation has increased with the popularisation of using 
social networks as a source for news and due to the growing suspicion of tra-
ditional media as intermediaries and interpreters, opening “the floodgates to 
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information and misinformation, truth and lies, scientific and non-scientific 
knowledge, facts and fiction” (Waisbord, 2018: 5). Thus, specific audiences 
with particular interests are reached (Mourão and Robertson, 2019: 2) in a 
context of confirmation bias (Wason, 1960) and cognitive dissonance (Fest-
inger, 1962). This leads to people only looking for information that confirms 
their previous views, and ignoring data that question their prejudices (López-
López, Castro Martínez and Oñate, 2020; Salaverría et al., 2020).
Consequently, disinformation is used to rally and unify people with relat-
ed worldviews (us), and through appealing to negative emotions to polarise 
others (them) (Fernández, Revilla and Andaluz, 2020). It distorts images that 
people use to construct their opinion on issues about which they have no 
knowledge, and which they view as dangerous and threatening to their per-
sonal and collective safety (Engesser et al., 2017a). Populist ideology, which 
usually finds greater support in polarised contexts, uses these emotions to 
construct an otherness based on characteristics that define immigrants and 
ethnic, religious and sexual minorities as enemies of the people (Reinemann 
et al., 2017: 2), resulting in hate speech (Sanguinetti et al., 2018).
Academic research on disinformation has grown in recent years and has 
found that false content on immigration and racism is one of the most fre-
quently studied categories, along with those related to politics (Guallar et al., 
2020). However, this growing popularity has not resulted in an abundance 
of bibliography on the subject, in which the recent studies by Fernández et 
al. (2020), Molina-Cañabate and Magallón-Rosa (2019) and Vorobyeva 
et al. (2020) are noteworthy.
There has, however, been a variety of studies exploring how the Spanish 
press and television have represented and covered immigration and ethnic 
minorities (Igartua et al., 2005, 2007, 2011, 2012; Muñiz et al., 2006; 
2008). Their conclusions indicate that the image the media issues of migrants 
and ethnic minorities is intertwined with socioeconomic threats, cultural 
dangers, aberrations, violence and crime (Marcos Ramos et al., 2014). In 
addition, studies that analysed the representation of immigration in Spanish 
fiction television programmes also associated immigrants with negative char-
acteristics – aggressive, conflictive, disloyal, intolerant, illiterate, unemployed 
and unstable (Marcos Ramos et al., 2014; Lacalle, 2008; Ruiz-Collantes et 
al., 2006). These studies found that those stereotyped and skewed character-
istics were used as attributes to construct an image of immigrants and ethnic 
minorities and contributed to the growth of xenophobia in Spain (Igartua et 
al., 2008, 2009).
This article uses a multimodal design to study the formal and discursive 
mechanisms used on the internet to construct an image of otherness. Its 
objective is to analyse the manipulation strategies used in fake news pieces 
that contain racist, xenophobic and Islamophobic data, as we believe disin-
formation plays a fundamental role in the construction of the image of 
migrants and persons belonging to ethnic or religious minorities.
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2. Multimodal cheapfakes
The definition of disinformation is content that can lead to an incorrect view 
of the political world and that serves to deceive or “intentionally alter the 
perception of large groups of people or societies and influence their behaviour 
(political, economic, ideological, etc.)” (Del-Fresno-García, 2019: 3). This 
includes false content – originating from websites, consisting of unreal stories 
and attributing authority to the sources that are issuing the deceptive infor-
mation (Salaverría et al., 2020) – but also rumours and incorrect or hyper-
partisan information (Tucker et al., 2018: 3).
Information disorders (Del-Fresno-García, 2019) pollute the truth (Cor-
ner, 2017: 1105) and their objective is to “cause harm, obtain benefits and 
influence people’s behaviour, although some ends are usually hidden 
and remain invisible” (Guallar et al., 2020: 597). Their level of deception 
may be influenced by bias or sensationalism, which can strain the truth with-
out directly including the disinformation (Mourão and Robertson, 2019: 2). 
Populist messages and hate speech often adopt these tactics (Engesser et al., 
2017a; Engesser et al., 2017b).
Salaverría et al. (2020) use the term ‘fake news pieces’ to refer to content 
that seems true but whose intention is to deceive the public, and content that 
is shared by any means of communication or digital platform (p. 4) – a defi-
nition that we will use for this study. Likewise, they produced a scale of sever-
ity, measured according to two categories: deceit and intention. On this 
basis, the higher the level of deceit and intention to spread the fake news 
pieces, the more serious it was (Salaverría et al., 2020).
Although disinformation was present before the popularisation of social 
networks as sources of information (Newman et al., 2020), its spread – and 
the proliferation of characteristics consistent with previous prejudices – has 
grown exponentially, encouraging the creation of communities of similar 
opinions (López-López et al., 2020). Previous studies have found that mes-
sages with disinformative content are shared more quickly than those with 
true content (Tarullo and Amado, 2020) and that there is less delay in shar-
ing messages that fit individual preferences (Calvo and Aruguete, 2018).
The circulation of multimodal content (information in visual and text 
format) through social networks has become more complex for several rea-
sons (Zhou, Wu and Zafarani, 2020). First, the methods used to detect dis-
information identify textual information and the combination of text and 
image (Zafarani et al., 2019), but they have been unable to examine the rela-
tionship between the two (Jin et al., 2017), despite the fact that the inclusion 
of text is a form of image manipulation (Zhukova, 2019). Moreover, the 
combination of image and text is significant in political communication due 
to the fact that it is purposefully used to draw the attention by appealing to 
emotions (Corner, 2017). In addition, digital technologies facilitate the 
manipulation of visual content by offering tools that can completely trans-
form material, creating disinformation narratives (Tandoc, Lim and Ling, 
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2018). In this respect, although deepfakes – that require quite advanced tech-
nological skills to falsify content – are seen as a principal problem in the intri-
cate network of information disorders (Del-Fresno-García, 2019), recent 
studies have found that cheapfakes actually cause the most concern as they 
have gained the most ground in disinformative digital flows (Paris and Don-
ovan, 2019). A cheapfake is “a media news piece that has been crudely 
manipulated, edited, mislabeled, or taken out of context to spread disinfor-
mation” (Schick, 2020) and does not require complex technological skills to 
produce or spread.
This makes the work carried out by verification platforms identifying dis-
information absolutely crucial (Molina-Cañabate and Magallón-Rosa, 2019). 
Based on the above, and inspired by a recent article by Salaverría et al. (2020), 
this methodologically designed study has used the following research ques-
tions as a reference:
 — RQ1. What formats were used for the dissemination of fake news pie-
ces containing racist, xenophobic or Islamophobic information in 
Spain during 2020?
 — RQ2. What sources did these fake news pieces use and to what degree 
of deception?
 — RQ3. What characteristics did they transmit and with what frequency?
 — RQ4. What format did the shared images have and what role did the 
text contained in them play?
 — RQ5. In the case of fake news pieces that used photographs, what was 
their content?
 — RQ6. In the case of fake news pieces that used other types of images, 
what was their reference and to what degree of truth were they repro-
duced?
3. Method
This study was limited to 2020 and used a content analysis methodology 
(Krippendorff, 1990).
3.1. Corpus
The research corpus consisted of fake news pieces that contained racist, xeno-
phobic or Islamophobic information discredited in 2020 by the four Spanish 
information verification media accredited by the International Fact-Checking 
Network (IFCN), a network that in January 2021 included 75 media entities 
from all over the world specialised in verifying information. Specifically:
 — Maldita.es. Digital media company founded by journalists Clara Jimé-
nez and Julio Montes and edited by the non-profit organisation Mal-
dita Contra la Desinformación.
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 — Newtral. Digital media company that has been edited by the Newtral 
Media Audiovisual production company since 2018, owned by the 
journalist Ana Pastor.
 — Efe Verifica. The Efe Agency fact-checking department, since 2019.
 — Verificat. Digital media company founded in 2019 by journalists 
Lorenzo Marini and Alba Tobell and edited by the non-profit organi-
sation Associació Verificat.
One of the group’s researchers collected and added the fake news pieces 
and refutations published by these media between 1 January and 31 Decem-
ber 2020 to a database. The total sample collected was 2,997 texts, of which 
8.4% (n=253) referred to fake news pieces that construct otherness through 
hatred for ethnic, origin or religious reasons, a condition for inclusion that 
was observed by two of the author researchers collecting the samples, who 
resolved any differences jointly. After discarding the publications that con-
tained compilations or repeatedly alluded to the same fake news piece, the 
final corpus comprised 161 units of analysis.
3.2. Analysis variables
The content analysis was carried out by applying a coding manual, as shown 
in Tables 1 and 2, which considers the study of six variables common to the 
entire corpus (n=161) and nine that are specific: three for fake news pieces 
spread through images (n=76), four for the cases in which these images were 
photographs (n=37) and two when they were screenshots of documents, 
posters, social network posts or media websites (n=27). The analysis consid-
ered both the headline and the text contained in the refutation and the fake 
news piece as well as the multimedia materials included in the disinformation 
material – links, audio files, images and videos – thus ensuring that the study 
carried out was fully multimodal.
The common variables of source and type of fake news piece are inspired 
by the recent research carried out by Salaverría et al. (2020) on disinforma-
tion linked to the COVID-19 pandemic in Spain. The former categorises the 
source as anonymous when it is not reflected in the fake news piece; ficti-
tious, when it has been invented by the fake news piece itself; an impersonat-
ed entity when the entity exists, but has not delivered the message; and a real 
entity, when the entity exists and has issued the message. The latter distin-
guishes between: 1) joke, spreading false information with mocking or satiri-
cal intent; 2) exaggeration, a message that exaggerates a certain aspect of real-
ity to the point that it crosses into deceit; 3) taken out of context, fake news 
piece that distorts the conditions in which information was produced; and 
4) deceptive, disinformation that completely falsifies reality to give the wrong 
idea or impression (Salaverría et al., 2020: 10). The other variables and cate-
gories were created by the authors.
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Table 1. Common variables and categories of analysis
Variables Categories Reliability
1. Format 1) Simple text. 2) Link. 3) Audio file. 4) Image. 
5) Video.
αk = 0.857
2. Addition [only if v1≠1] 1) Text. 2) No addition. agreement = 100%
3. Source 1) Anonymous. 2) Fictitious. 3) Impersonated 
political/institutional entity. 4) Impersonated 
media entity. 5) Real political/institutional 
entity. 6) Real media entity. 7) Real citizen.
αk = 0.854
4. Type 1) Joke. 2) Exaggeration. 3) Taken out of 
context. 4) Deceptive.
αk = 0.747
5. Characterisation 1) Illegal immigration. 2) Benefits and 
favourable treatment. 3) Lack of Western 
values and/or civility. 4) Transmission of 
diseases. 5) Vandalism / crime / violence. 
6) Terrorism. 7) Intention of territorial 
expansion. 8) Others / Does not apply.
αk = 0.821
6. Recurrence 1) Frequent. 2) Infrequent. agreement = 90%
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Table 2. Specific variables and categories of analysis
Variables Categories Reliability
7. Type of image [only if v1=4] 1) Photograph. 2) Screenshot of a 
document, poster, social network post or 
media website. 3) Image-text composition.
αk = 1
8. Text on the fake news 
piece
[only if v7=1 or 3] 1) Yes. 2) No. agreement = 100%
9. Function of the text [only if v8 =1] 1) Locate the image. 2) Put the 
image into context. 3) Verbatim quote.
αk = 0.899
10. Number of 
photographs
[only if v7=1] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. αk = 1
11. Function of the 
variety
[only if v10>1] 1) Comparison. 
2) Reinforcement.
agreement = 100%
12. Content of the 
photograph
[only if v7=1] 1) Contains people. 2) Does not 
contain people.
agreement = 100%
13. Main characters in 
the photograph
[only if v12=1] 1) One person. 2) A group of 
people. 3) Crowd.
αk = 0.856
14. Type of screenshot [only if v7=2] 1) Document. 2) A social network 
post. 3) Media entity website. 4) Poster.
αk = 0.871
15. Truthfulness of the 
screenshot
[only if v7=2] 1) Exists. 2) Does not exist. agreement = 85.2%
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
The coding of the common variables was carried out by one researcher. 
To validate its reliability, a test was performed in which that researcher and 
an author researcher separately analysed a sample made up of 12.5% of the 
fake news pieces (n=20). In the case of the specific variables, the entire corpus 
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was coded by two researchers, also separately from each other. In both cases, 
the agreement percentages obtained in the dichotomous variables and Krip-
pendorff’s alpha coefficients obtained in the categorical variables, shown in 
Tables 1 and 2, allowed us to validate the reliability of the research (Igartua, 
2006).
4. Results
4.1. Format of the fake news pieces
The main format taken by the disinformation was static image (47.2%, 
n=76), audiovisual (31.1%, n=50), plain text (10.6%, n=17), link to media 
stories (6.2%, n=10) and audio files (5%, n=8). Among the fake news pieces 
that did not use exclusively text (n=144), only 18.7% (n=27) were shared in 
their original format (images, videos, links and audio files), while 81.3% 
(n=117) were shared with additional texts written on them or shared by the 
users themselves.
The cross-analysis of both variables (Table 3) showed that 96% of the 
videos (n=48), 78.9% of the images (n=60) and 60% of the links (n=6) 
were shared with additional text; the proportion is only inverse in the case 
of audio files, with which text anchoring was associated in 37.5% of the 
cases (n=3).
Table 3. Formats of the fake news pieces and text additions





Simple text Not applicable Not applicable 17 10.6%
Link 6 4 10 6.2%
Audio 3 5 8 5.0%
Image 60 16 76 47.2%
Video 48 2 50 31.1%
Total 117 (81.3%) 27 (18.7%) 161 100%
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
4.2. Fake news sources and types
Some 50.3% of the disinformation pieces did not mention a source (n=81), 
20.4% impersonated the source (n=36) and another 20.4% used real sources 
(n=36). In both these last two cases, the source came mainly from a politi-
cal-institutional scope. Only 5% of fake news pieces invented the source 
(n=8). The most popular types of fake news pieces were deceptive (41.8%, 
n=77) and taken out of context (41.6%, n=67), while exaggerations (7.5%, 
n=12) and jokes (3.1%, n=5) were a minority.
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The cross-analysis of both variables (Table 4) confirmed that the fake 
news pieces that did not identify a source and those that used real sources, 
mostly used a method of taking the information out of context, and those 
that impersonated sources opted for the deceptive method.
Table 4. Fake news sources and types
Source / type of 
fake news







Anonymous 2 7 43 29 81 50.3%
Fictional 0 0 0 8 8 5.0%
Impersonated 
political entity
2 0 4 27 33 20.5%
Impersonated 
media entity
0 0 0 3 3 1.9%
Real political entity 0 2 13 4 19 11.8%
Real media entity 0 3 3 5 11 6.8%
Real citizen 1 0 4 1 6 3.7%
Total 5 (3.1%) 12 (7.5%) 67 (41.6%) 77 (41.8%) 161 100%
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
4.3. Characteristics and frequency of the fake news pieces
The characteristics most associated with otherness were a supposed favour-
able treatment and receiving aid (35.4%, n=57), vandalism and crime 
(21.1%, n=34) and illegal immigration (12.4%, n=20). The least present 
characteristics were a lack of Western values (7.5%, n=12), disease trans-
mission (6.2%, n=10), terrorism (5.6%, n=9) and intention of territorial 
expansion (4.3%, n=7).
46.6% of the fake news pieces analysed were frequent (n=75), compared 
to 53.4% that were not (n=86). This condition was established with the refu-
tations published by the four media entities that the sample comprised, and a 
repeated presence of the fake news piece in one or more media platforms on 
different dates.
As shown by Table 5, the characteristics that were more frequent than the 
average of 46.6% were those that characterised people of different origin, 
ethnicity or religion with a lack of Western values (75% frequency, n=9) and 
those that associated them with terrorism (66%, n=6).
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Table 5. Characteristics associated with otherness in fake news pieces and their frequency
Characteristic / frequency Frequent Infrequent Total
Number of fake 
news pieces
Percentage
Illegal immigration 9 11 20 12.4%
Supposedly favourable treatment 26 31 57 35.4%
Lack of Western values 9 3 12 7.5%
Transmission of diseases 3 7 10 6.2%
Vandalism and crime 12 22 34 21.1%
Terrorism 6 3 9 5.6%
Intention of territorial expansion 3 4 7 4.3%
Other / Not applicable 7 5 12 7.5%
Total 75 (46.6%) 86 (53.4%) 161 100.0%
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
4.4. Format of the images
Photographs made up 48.7% of the images (n=37); 35.5% were screenshots 
of documents, posters or social network posts / media entity websites (n=27); 
and 15.8% were image-text compositions created for social networks (n=12). 
This category includes both the layout of text on a coloured background and 
the combination of text and photography as long as the image covers less 
than half of the composition.
In turn, the study of the presence of text over the images that allow this 
anchoring (photographs and compositions, n=49) shows that it was only 
present in 42.9% of them (n=21). This analysis excluded screenshots, as their 
function is to produce or reproduce references to text, which we will explore 
in section 4.6.
The cross-analysis of both variables (Table 6) shows that only 24.3% of 
the photographs were shared with text printed over them. Among the func-
tions of the text printed over the photographs and in the image-text composi-
tions, the addition of contextual explanations stands out (66%, n=14), while 
adding verbatim quotes (23.8%, n=5) and locating the images (9.5%, n=2) 
were a minority.
Table 6. Format of images and presence of text in the fake news piece itself
Format of images / text 
included in the fake 
news piece itself
No text Text Total














Image-text composition 0 0 7 5 12 15.8%
Total 28 2 14 5 76 100.0%
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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4.5. Content and elements of manipulation of the photographs
Regarding the content of the photographs (n=37), 73% showed people in 
different situations (n=27), compared to 27% that reproduced objects or 
interior or exterior spaces (n=10). Of the photographs that included people, 
only 18.6% (n=5) showed a single person; in most cases it was impossible to 
make out who was carrying out the action, as they mostly showed a group of 
people (40.7%, n=11) or a crowd (40.7%, n=11).
In turn, 67.6% of the fake news pieces that reproduced photographs 
showed a single image (n=25), compared to 32.4% that contained two or 
more images (n=12). When it occurred, this diversity was more oriented to 
reinforcing the message (n=10) than to comparison (n=2).
Finally, 86.5% of the fake news pieces that included photographs repro-
duced the images in those photographs without any editing (n=32), com-
pared to 13.5% that did edit the images (n=5) using resources such as refram-
ing, substitutions or highlighting.
4.6. Content and truth of the screenshots
Regarding the content of the screenshots (n=27), 51.9% referenced an offi-
cial document or communication (n=14), 22.2% showed a social network 
post (n=6), 18.5% showed a poster (n=5) and only 7.4% referenced a news 
item. This type of publication included a true reference 59.3% of the time 
(n=16), while in 40.7% of cases it had a reference that did not exist (n=11).
The cross-analysis of both variables (Table 7) shows that the screenshots 
of documents or posters mostly included true references, while the screen-
shots of news items were always false. In screenshots of social network posts, 
there was a balance between true and false references.
Table 7. Format of the screenshot and truth of the reference
Format of the screenshot/






Document 10 4 14 51.9%
Screenshot of social network posts 3 3 6 22.2%
Screenshot of news item 0 2 2 7.4%
Poster 3 2 5 18.5%
Total 16 (59.3%) 11 (40.7%) 27 100.0%
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
5. Discussion and conclusions
This analysis of the racist, xenophobic and Islamophobic fake news pieces 
shared in Spain throughout 2020 has allowed us to draw conclusions on the 
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multimodal manipulations used to construct disinformation and a deceptive 
representation of otherness on the internet.
Unlike what was found in previous studies, which concluded that fake 
news pieces operated mainly textually (Salaverría et al., 2020), this research 
study confirms the predominance of visual and audiovisual formats. More-
over, we saw that disinformation is not generated through the manipulation 
of these resources, with image editing techniques, but through the addition of 
texts, which shows the importance of multimodality when constructing 
deceptive content. Similarly, fake news pieces are not only constructed 
through exaggeration – which contributes to a stereotyped representation 
of others, as has already been confirmed by previous studies on the image of 
immigration in Spanish press and television (Igartua et al, 2005, 2007, 2011, 
2012; Lacalle, 2008; Marcos Ramos et al., 2014; Muñiz et al., 2006, 2008; 
Ruiz-Collantes et al., 2006) – but often by taking the image out of context 
and showing it in a deceptive manner. Thus, fake news pieces not only con-
tribute to multimodal disinformation about otherness, but also facilitate the 
generation of hate speech (Fernández et al., 2020; Sanguinetti et al., 2018) 
by being shared on social networks, resulting in the formation of communi-
ties with like-minded opinions, through an appeal to negative emotions 
towards the unknown, which is presented as dangerous (Engesser et al., 
2017a; López-López et al., 2020).
This study confirms the representation of otherness as an entity that 
receives state aid and allegedly favourable treatment, but also one that vanda-
lises, commits crime and is violent, accentuated by showing minorities as a 
group and not as individuals. Moreover, the fake news pieces that transmit 
characteristics representing an otherness that is contrary to Western values 
(us) and supports terrorist acts (them), that is, an enemy of the people (Rein-
emann et al., 2017: 2), are frequent.
Although previous studies have found that fake news pieces need credible 
sources to appear plausible (Salaverría et al., 2020), this study did not find 
that these fake news pieces used known sources to provide credibility, at least 
not in a generalised manner. Although most of the sources identified came 
from a political/institutional scope, the sources that were most predominant 
were anonymous and, by making the sources anonymous, the authors of the 
fake news pieces avoided being penalised for committing hate crimes. The 
credibility authors sought to give the pieces was found in the format of the 
images. Screenshots mostly include documents and posters that were origi-
nally true, with additional text that takes the image out of context or deceives, 
objectives that the research by Salaverría et al. (2020) classified as very serious 
if they are also accompanied by the negative intentions of whoever creates 
and shares them.
To this effect, there is a mechanism that we could call “fake news person-
alisation”: users add text to images to take them out of context or deceive, 
thus creating multimodal disinformation about otherness. Although digital 
technologies provide tools for content manipulation (Tandoc et al., 2018), 
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this study finds that those who create and share multimodal disinformation 
about otherness are extremely unprofessional. Far from intending to provide 
credibility and bring opinions together, their unprofessional manner reveals 
their intention to embolden similar positions, providing deceptive reasons to 
communities whose opinions are already formed (us) in an environment 
where confirmation bias (Wason, 1960) and cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1962) act to reaffirm previous opinions and prejudices (López-López et al., 
2020; Salaverría et al., 2020). Therefore, this study shows that you do not 
have to have a subtle design to deceive – as you do with deepfakes, which 
require advanced technological skills (Paris and Donovan, 2019) – as proven 
by the popularity of cheapfakes, which are used to generate coarse and crude 
disinformation multimodal content to promote hate speech (Sanguinetti et 
al., 2018).
This study has some limitations. The first is that only the fake news piec-
es discredited by the four Spanish media entities accredited by the Interna-
tional Fact-Checking Network have been included in the sample. Despite 
this, we believe that the various criteria for collecting disinformation on 
these platforms, as well as the numerous analysis units studied, have provid-
ed the sample with sufficient representativeness. Second, the texts included 
in the disinformation materials have been analysed, serving as an anchor, 
but – given the impossibility of compiling them – none of the accompany-
ing texts posted by users has been analysed. However, we believe that the 
present study – which has analysed both the texts contained in the disinfor-
mation materials and the multimedia materials associated with them, espe-
cially the images, and the relationships between both elements – has taken a 
fully multimodal approach. A more in-depth analysis of the discursive con-
struction of the additional texts (Fernández et al., 2020) remains for future 
research, as well as an analysis of the audiovisual manipulation elements 
used in videos.
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